The Determinants of De Novo Bank Survival by DeYoung, Robert et al.
The Determinants of De Novo Bank Survival
Robert DeYoung *
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60604.
Phone: 312-322-5396. Email: robert.deyoung@chi.frb.org
Iftekhar Hasan
New York University
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
Phone: 212 998-0329. E-mail: ihasan@stern.nyu.edu
William C. Hunter
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60604.
Phone: 312-322-5800
* This paper reflects the views of the authors, not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or their staffs.   
1The Determinants of De Novo Bank Survival
Abstract:  The number of newly chartered, or ‘de novo,’ commercial banks in the U.S. has
increased every year since 1994.  These new banks are potentially important for preserving
competition and providing credit in consolidating banking markets.  However, like other new
business ventures, newly chartered banks can be prone to failure.  To investigate the long-run
financial viability of newly chartered banks, we estimate a ‘split-population’ duration model for
656 commercial banks chartered in 1984 and 1985.  To provide a benchmark, we estimate a
similar model for 1,288 small established banks located in the same geographic markets.
Our results are consistent with a ‘life-cycle’ theory of bank failure.  Because new banks
are heavily capitalized and hold portfolios of unseasoned loans, they are initially less likely to fail
than established banks.  But rapid asset growth, subpar profitability, and declining loan quality
gradually erode their capital stocks.  De novo failure rates catch up with, and then surpass,
established bank failure rates within five years.  After seven years, de novo banks are twice as
likely to fail as established banks.   
We find similar determinants of failure for de novo and established banks, including 
adverse economic conditions, rapid asset growth, concentrations of risky and illiquid investments,
large amounts of purchased funds, and excess overhead spending.  For de novo banks that
eventually fail, we find that failure is accelerated by concentrations of business loans, large
amounts of purchased funds, low capital ratios, and excess overhead spending; failure was
delayed by fast asset growth, holding company affiliation, and holding a federal charter. 
We find no significant evidence that de novo national banks were more likely to fail than
de novo state chartered banks, which suggests that the OCC’s relatively lenient chartering policies
increased local market competition without materially increasing new bank failure.  We find that
low capital ratios accelerate failure for de novo banks that do fail, but we find that capital ratios
do not significantly predict which new banks will eventually fail.  Thus, requiring higher levels of
capital for young banks does not reduce their probability of failure, but rather serves as a buffer
that provides extra time to resolve young banks should they become troubled institutions. 
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Introduction
The number of newly chartered, or ‘de novo,’ commercial banks in the U.S. has increased
in each of the past six years.  These new banks can be an important source of credit for small
business, and can help preserve competition in local banking markets in which established banks
have merged or been acquired.  However, like most other new business ventures, newly chartered
banks can be financially fragile and prone to failure.  Before a new bank can become a permanent
source of competition and credit, it must first survive long enough to become financially viable
itself.  In this study, we estimate the likelihood that the typical de novo bank will survive that
long, and we also explore the reasons why de novo banks fail. 
Over 6,000 new commercial banks have been chartered by U.S. banking authorities since
the mid-1960s.  As shown in Figure 1, these start-ups occurred in a series of three waves: one that
peaked in the early 1970s, one that peaked in the mid-1980s, and one that may be peaking now. 
We examine 656 de novo banks that were chartered near the peak of the second of these three
waves, which occurred just before the largest episode of bank failures since the Great Depression.
 We observe the rates at which these new banks failed, the timing of those failures, and the
determinants of those failures.  To serve as a benchmark, we perform parallel tests for 1,288
banks that were already well established at the time.
Our results are consistent with a ‘life-cycle’ theory of bank failure.  Because newly
chartered banks are heavily capitalized and hold portfolios of unseasoned loans, they are initially
less likely to fail than established banks.  But rapid asset growth, subpar profitability, and
declining loan quality gradually erode these capital stocks.  After about five years the de novo
3banks are just as likely to fail as established banks, and after about seven years de novo banks are
twice as likely to fail as established banks.  Despite this relatively high failure rate, de novo banks
tend to fail for the same reasons as established banks.  We find that adverse economic conditions,
rapid asset growth, concentrations of risky and illiquid investments, large amounts of purchased
funds, and excess overhead spending reduce the likelihood of survival for both types of banks. 
Thus, even though the risk drivers are similar at new and established banks, market forces tend to
punish these risks more severely at young banks.
Our results should help inform bank regulators charged with a number of tasks related to
de novo banks, including: approving new bank charters; establishing capital levels for de novo
banks; determining the frequency de novo bank safety and soundness exams; performing antitrust
analysis in markets recently entered by de novo banks; and watching for early signals of de novo
bank failure.  Because the root of our investigation is the financial health and success of newly
chartered banks, our findings should also be useful for managers of newly chartered banks, and
for prospective investors in new bank start-up ventures.
The paper begins in section 1 by summarizing current and past U.S. regulatory policy
toward de novo banks.  Section 2 is a short review of recent research on de novo banks.  In
section 3 we describe our de novo bank and established bank data sets.  We apply two different
analytic frameworks to these data.  In section 4 we compare the time trends of several financial
ratios for the de novo banks and the established banks.  Based on these comparisons, we form
expectations about the comparative rates at which new banks and established banks will fail over
time.  In section 5 we develop a ‘split-population’ duration model, and in section 6 we apply this
model to the data.  The results of these models largely conform to our expectations.  In section 7
4we summarize our results and draw policy conclusions based on those results.
1.  A brief overview of de novo bank entry and regulation 
There are a number of explanations for the periodic increases and decreases in new bank
charters shown in Figure 1.  Like all new business ventures, new banks are more likely to form
when business conditions are good.  The waves of chartering activity in the 1980s and 1990s
correspond roughly with general economic expansions, while the trough in between these two
waves corresponds with a banking crisis in the late 1980s and a national recession in the early
1990s.  Regulatory changes can also have an impact.  A number of states relaxed or repealed unit
banking laws during the 1980s, which afforded banking companies in those states the opportunity
to enter other geographic markets, either by starting a new bank or by acquiring an existing bank.
Increased merger activity has also encouraged de novo entry.  During the cost-cutting and
reorganization that generally follow an acquisition, experienced bank employees often lose their
jobs, and some small business and retail depositors become dissatisfied.  These disruptions
provide a ready supply of depositors, borrowers, and managerial expertise for de novo banks.
De novo national banks are chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), while de novo state banks are chartered by the banking commissions of their home states.
 Historically, the OCC has been more liberal in granting charters than most of the state chartering
authorities; its policy has been that market forces, not the chartering authority, should determine
which local markets need and can support new commercial banks.  In contrast, many state
chartering authorities have historically used >convenience and needs= tests when ruling on
applications for new bank charters, denying applications when the authorities believe that the
convenience and needs of the banking public are already adequately served by existing banks. 
5Although this difference in federal-versus-state chartering philosophy has diminished over time, it
implies that national banks chartered during the 1980s may have been less likely to survive than de
novo state banks chartered at the same time.1
Beyond this difference in chartering philosophy, the policies of the various bank chartering
and regulatory authorities toward de novo banks are quite similar.  A primary concern is that
newly chartered banks start out with enough equity capital to survive through the initial years of
negative earnings and rapid asset growth that is typical of de novo banks.  The dollar amount of
start-up financial capital required for approval might be as low as $3 million, or as high as $20
million, depending on the proposed location and business plan of the prospective bank.  Larger
amounts of start-up capital are generally required for urban banks, for banks locating in vibrant
economic markets, and for banks with business strategies that feature fast growth (e.g., a new
Internet bank).
Once a new bank opens its doors for business, regulatory scrutiny shifts from the
applications staff to the examination staff.  Bank supervisors pay closer attention to newly
chartered banks than to similarly situated established banks, although the difference in treatment
varies depending on the new bank=s primary regulator.  Federal Reserve supervisors will conduct
full scope examinations for safety and soundness at a newly chartered bank at 6 months intervals
(established banks are examined every 12 to 18 months) and will continue to schedule exams at
this frequency until the bank receives a strong composite CAMEL ratings (i.e., a rating of 1 or 2)
                                         
1.  DeYoung and Hasan (1998) discuss the convergence of state and federal chartering philosophies.  Despite this
convergence, Seelig and Critchfield (1998) find that the states remain more likely to consider local banking conditions
when evaluating a charter application.  For example, they find that income per capita per bank branch was a stronger
predictor of de novo state bank entry than of de novo national bank entry between 1995 and 1997.
6in two consecutive exams.  The FDIC requires all newly chartered state and national banks
maintain an 8% Tier 1 equity capital-to-risk based assets ratio for their first three years, while the
Federal Reserve requires new state chartered Fed member banks to hold this ratio above 9% for
three years.  These temporary extranormal capital requirements for new banks (the Tier 1
requirement for established banks to be considered >adequately capitalized= is only 4%) are a
relatively recent supervisory response to de novo failure experience of the 1980s.  Bank
supervisors also restrict new banks from paying out dividends for several years, and in some cases
require new banks to maintain minimum levels of loan loss reserves.
These entry barriers and regulatory covenants are severe compared to those faced by most
non-bank start-ups, and this >selection bias= naturally leads to a higher survival rate for new
banks.  Bartholomew and Whalen (1996) provide evidence that 17 percent of the commercial
banks that started up between 1980 and 1994 also failed during that time period.  In our sample of
de novo banks chartered in 1984 and 1985, about 23 percent had failed by the end of 1998 (see
section 3).  Although these may seem like high failure rates, they are lower than the failure rates
typically reported for business start-ups in general, despite that fact that they occurred during the
largest episode of bank failures since the Great Depression.2
2.  Recent research on de novo banks
                                         
2.  Raw data reported by the Small Business Administration (1992) suggests that at least 60% of new business ventures
with less than 500 employees that started in 1977-78 failed within 6 years.  Kirchhoff (1994, pp. 153-169) argues that
this raw data overstates the small business failure rate, and after adjusting it he concludes that in a ‘best case scenario’
18% of new business ventures will fail within 8 years of starting up.  In comparison, the 23% failure rate over 14 years
for our de novo banks is relatively low, considering that it occurred in a ‘worst case scenario.’
7Although Figure 1 shows that de novo entry has followed a cyclical pattern at the macro
level, changing conditions in local banking markets have a strong influence on where newly
chartered banks locate.  Moore and Skelton (1998) show that de novo banks are more likely to
start up in markets where economic growth is high, in markets where competition among existing
banks is weak, and in markets where small banks are under-represented.  These results suggest
that new banks will be more likely to start-up in local markets where mergers have reduced the
number of competing banks and/or where existing banks are exercising market power. 
One recent study provides support for this suggestion.  Berger, B ime, Goldberg and
White (1999) examine de novo bank entry between 1980 and 1998, and find that entry is more
likely in local markets that have experienced mergers or acquisitions during the previous 3 years,
particularly when those acquisitions involved large banking organizations.  In contrast, Seelig and
Critchfield (1998) conclude that local market entry by acquisition deters de novo entry.  The latter
study includes both banks and thrifts, and examines a relatively short time period (1995-1997)
during which banking conditions were uniformly excellent and restrictions on geographic mobility
were virtually non-existent.3
Once de novo banks enter a market and begin operating, their financial performance tends
to lag that of established banks by a considerable margin.  DeYoun  and Hasan (1998) measured
the profit efficiency of over a thousand de novo banks during the 1980s and early 1990s, and
compared these estimates to established bank efficiency levels.  They find that the typical de novo
                                         
3.  Studies of local market entry by already established banks fi d that entry is more likely in highly profitable markets,
but less likely in highly concentrated local banking markets.  See Amel and Liang (1997).  Of course, the causes and
consequences of a new bank start-up may be quite different from the causes and consequences of market entry by an
already established bank. 
8bank was only about 25% as efficient as the typical established bank after one year of operation;
about 50% as efficient after two years; about 75% as efficient after 5 years; and did not become
100% efficient until its ninth year of operation.  These results are consistent with earlier studies
(e.g., Huyser 1986, Hunter and Srinivasan 1990) that used accounting ratios to measure de novo
bank performance.4
Although numerous studies have estimated models of financial institution failure (e.g.,
Whalen 1991, Thomson 1992, Wheelock and Wilson 1995, Cole and Gunther 1996), only a few
studies have modeled the failure of new financial institutions.  Bartholomew and Whalen (1996)
estimated a binomial logit model of de novo bank failure, and found that poor asset quality,
reliance on purchased funds financing, low profitability, low capital stocks, and adverse economic
conditions all contributed to de novo bank failure.  Hunter, Verbr gge and Whidbee (1996)
found similar results for de novo savings and loans using a split-population duration model.  They
found that credit risk, adverse economic conditions, low capital stocks, and cost inefficiencies all
contributed to de novo thrift failure.  In addition, they found that failing thrifts with large amounts
of nonperforming assets and/or that were growing fast tended to fail more slowly, which they
interpret as evidence of regulatory forbearance.  DeYoung (1999) estimated a split-population
duration model for de novo commercial banks chartered in 1985, and compared the results to a
similar model estimated for established banks.  His results support a ‘life-cycle’ theory of bank
failure in which new banks initially have a low probability of failing, but eventually become
substantially more likely to fail than established banks. 
                                         
4.  See DeYoung and Hasan (1998) for a more complete review of this literature.
9This study takes an approach similar to that of DeYoung (1999), but we make a number
of methodological improvements.  First, our regression specifications are richer.  This allows us to
test a large variety of hypotheses about the determinants of de novo bank failure.  Second,
because we estimate these richly specified models for both de novo and established banks, we can
test whether the determinants of failure are different for these two sets of banks.  Third, we do not
limit our investigation to a single year of de novo banks.  This improves our ability to draw
statistical inferences, and it eliminates the possibility that the results are driven by phenomena
from a single year.5 
3.  Data
Our data set contains information on 656 de novo banks and 1,288 established banks.  The
de novo bank sample is essentially the population of new commercial banks that opened their
doors during the eight quarters from 1984:Q1 through 1985:Q4.  We observe bank start-ups
centering around 1984-85 for two reasons.  As shown in Figure 1, this is the peak of the 1980s
bank chartering wave (so we have lots of de novo banks to observe), and it occurred just ahead of
an historically large episode of failures among both established and newly chartered banks (so we
have a statistically meaningful number of failures for our survival modeling). 
All of the established banks had been in operation for at least 25 years as of the beginning
of 1985.  We constrained the established bank sample across three additional parameters so that it
                                         
5.  We observe roughly twice as many de novo banks as the study by DeYoung (1999).  In the next draft of this study,
we plan to re-double both the number of de novo bank observations and the years in which these banks were chartered. 
In addition, the next draft of this study will include an expanded list of exogenous variables in the durations models.
10
would provide a good benchmark for the de novo banks.  Each of the established banks held less
than $100 million in assets (because de novo banks are small), had at least a 6% capital-to-asset
ratio (because de novo banks are initially well capitalized), and was located in an MSA or county
included in the de novo bank sample (to neutralize differences in economic and regulatory
conditions). 
We tracked each of the de novo banks and established banks quarterly across time,
beginning with the first quarter of operation for de novo banks (1985:Q1 for the established
banks), and ending with 1998:Q4.  We define each bank’s ‘duration’ as the number of quarters it
remained in the data set.  Duration ranges from t=1 (for banks that either failed or were acquired
after just one quarter) to as high as t=60 (for banks chartered in 1984:Q1 that survived for the
entire sample period).  For the purposes of this study, we define ‘failure’ as any one of the
following: (a) a bank was declared insolvent by its regulator; (b) a bank received regulatory
assistance (e.g., a capital injection) without which it would have become insolvent; or (c) a bank
was acquired soon after its net worth had declined to less than 1% of its assets.
We compiled financial data for the de novo banks and the established banks from the
Reports of Condition and Income (call reports), and data on new charters and bank failures from
the National Information Center database.  Summary statistics for these data are displayed in
Figure 1.  These raw data suggest that de novo banks exited the market more often and more
quickly than established banks.  Only about a third of the de novo banks survived until the end of
the sample period, while 23.48% of the de novo banks failed and 43.45% were acquired.  In
contrast, over half of the established banks survived until the end of the sample period, while only
6.60% of the established banks failed and only 37.73% were acquired.  On average, de novo
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banks lasted only 37 quarters (about 9 years), compared to about 43 quarters (about 11 years) for
the average established bank.   
Although we selected the both sets of banks from the same geographic markets, we did
not draw identical numbers of de novo and established banks from each market.  Thus, the two
samples have different geographic characteristics.  A relatively high percentage of the de novo
banks were located in the ‘energy’ states of Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado (49% vs.
30%) and in urban areas (78% vs. 73%).  On average, de novo banks operated in more highly
concentrated local markets than established banks (HHI=1597 vs. 1369).  A greater percentage of
de novo banks held national bank charters (62% vs. 28%), and a smaller percentage of de novo
banks were affiliates of multibank holding companies (12% vs. 17%).     
The financial ratios in Table 1 were measured at the beginning of 1985 for the established
banks, and after four full quarters of operations for the de novo banks.  These ratios reveal
substantial differences between newly chartered and more seasoned banks.  The de novo banks
were smaller (assets of $11 million vs. $42 million for the established banks), better capitalized
(13 percent equity ratio vs. 9 percent), less profitable (-1.22 percent return on assets vs. 0.99
percent), and faster growing (182% annual growth rate vs. 8 percent).  The evidence suggests
that de novo banks financed this fast growth with large deposits (24% of assets vs. only 10% for
the established banks).  The de novo banks invested a smaller portion of their assets in liquid
assets (36% to 45%), especially marketable securities (12% to 32%), but they invested a larger
portion of their assets in loans (59% to 52%), especially in business loans (23% to 18%). 
Because their loan portfolios were comprised of new credits, de novo bank nonperf rmi g loan
ratios were extremely low (0.36% of assets vs. 1.34%).  Finally, de novo banks spent relatively
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more on salaries (1.86% of assets vs. 1.66%) and on premises and equipment (0.85% of assets vs.
0.47%) than established banks.       
4.  Performance trends
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 establish that de novo banks are initially quite different
from established banks.  But of course, these differences do not last forever.  Previous studies
have documented how de novo banks gradually come to resemble established banks as they age
and mature (e.g., Hunter and Srinivasan 1990, DeYoung 1999, and DeYoung, Goldberg, and
White 1999).  In Figure 2, we chart this evolution for the 656 de novo banks in our data set.
Figures 2A through 2D display quarterly time trends of four important financial ratios --
return on assets, equity-to-assets, annual asset growth, and nonperforming loans to assets -- for
both the de novo bank and the established bank samples.  In each of the figures the horizontal axis
has 56 increments.  For the established banks, these increments correspond to 56 consecutive
calendar quarters (from 1985:Q1 to 1998:Q4).  For the de novo banks, these increments
correspond to age in quarters (from t=1 to t=56). 
For example, in Figure 2A the light-colored solid line indicates that the median return on
assets for the established banks during the first quarter of our sample period (1985:Q1) was about
1.25%, while the dark-colored solid line indicates that the median return on assets for the de novo
banks during their first quarter of operation (t=1) was about -1.60%.  (Note that although t=1
occurs as early as 1984:Q1 for some de novo banks, and as late as 1985:Q4 for others, this eight-
quarter window is centered around 1985:Q1.)  The relative positions of these two solid lines
reveals the rate at which the gap in return on assets between de novo banks and established banks
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closes over time, holding economic and industry conditions roughly constant. 
Each of the figures also includes a pair of dashed lines which plot the median financial
ratios for the subsets of 217 (out of 656) de novo banks and 717 (out of 1,288) established banks
that survived until the end of the sample period.  Failed banks typically have lower than average
return on assets, lower than average capital ratios, and higher than average nonperforming loan
ratios.  The dashed lines allow us to assess the financial progress of de novo banks after
eliminating any systematic impact of failure (and acquisition) on the financial ratio averages.
The return on assets graph confirms the results of existing studies of de novo bank
profitability:  the typical new bank loses money until it is about 18 months old, and it continues to
materially underperform the average established bank for almost a decade.  Our adjustments for
survivor bias shift each of the graphs in the expected direction (i.e., median return on assets is
higher for the subset of survivors than for the entire sample), and this shift is substantial for some
banks in some years (e.g., about 25 basis points for 2-year old banks).  However, these shifts do
not materially alter the general shapes, or the relative shapes, of the trends in profitability. 
Interpreting the profitability trends in Figure 2A within the context of the performance
trends in the other three figures (asset growth , equity-to-assets, and n nperformi g loans)
provides insight into why and when de novo banks fail.  De novo banks grow their assets
extraordinarily fast during the first two years of their lives (Figure 2B).  This fast growth rate
increases the amount of assets against which new banks need to hold equity capital.  At the same
time, the negative profits generated during the first and second years of these banks= lives ar
depleting their equity capital.  So despite its initially high capital levels, the capital-to-asset ratio
of the typical new bank declines very quickly, dipping just below the capital level of the median
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established bank after about three years (Figure 2C).  Note that adjusting for survivor bias has no
appreciable affect on either the equity-to-assets trends or the asset growth trends.
Although newly chartered banks start out without any nonperforming loans, their loan
portfolios immediately begin to ‘season,’ causing their no performing loan ratios to reach the
median level for established banks after just three years (Figure 2D).  Note that adjusting for
survivor bias shifts the trend line for de novo nonperf rming loans downward; this shift is
substantial (as much as 0.5% in some quarters) and delays the convergence of de novo bank and
established bank loan quality for several years.
These four sets of performance trends suggest a ‘life-cycle’ explanation of de novo bank
failure.6  First, the performance trends imply that de novo banks will initially be less likely to fail
than established banks.  Despite heavy losses and high asset growth during their initial years, de
novo banks start out with very large capital cushions and very low levels of nonperforming loans.
 Second, the performance trends imply that de novo banks should become more likely to fail than
established banks some time after their third year of operations.  By that time, de novo bank loan
quality, asset growth, and (most importantly) capital reserves have reached or are approaching
established bank levels -- but de novo profitability still lags below established bank levels.  Finally,
the steady improvement in de novo bank profits, and the overall maturation of these banks over
time, imply that de novo bank failure rates will gradually converge to those of established banks. 
In the analysis that follows, we estimate failure time paths for de novo banks and
established banks, and test whether they correspond to the failure patterns implied by Figure 2. 
                                         
6.  This concept was introduced by DeYoung (1999).
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5.  Estimation methodology
We use a ‘split-population’ duration framework to estimate the probability of failure, the
expected survival time, and the determinants of each, for the banks in our de novo bank and
established bank samples.  Schmidt and Wit e (1989) developed the split-population approach,
and both Cole and Gunther (1995) and Hunter, Verbrugge, and Whidbee (1996) have estimated
split population models of financial institution failure.  The central failure concept in these models
is the hazard rate, the probability that a bank will fail at time t given that it has survived through
all of the previous time periods leading up to time t.
Assume that a population of N banks will fail over time period (0,t) according to some
probability distribution:
F(t) =  f(t)dt
0
Tz                                                               (1)
where f(t) is the associated probability density function and t, or ‘duration,’ is the length of time
between t=0  and the subsequent failure date T.  (For de novo banks t=0 is the start-up quarter. 
For established banks t=0 is 1985:Q1.)  The hazard function h(t) ca  then be written as a function
of F(t) and f(t) as follows:
h(t) =  
f(t)
1 - F(t)
 =  
f(t)
S(t)
                                                        (2)
where 1-F(t) = S(t) is the survival function, the probability that a bank has not failed as of time t.
The function h(T) gives the probability that a bank will fail at T conditional on surviving until T. 
When estimated, the general shape of the hazard function is constrained by the form of the
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probability distribution F(t) imposed on the data.  We use the log-logistic distribution, a fairly
flexible functional form that yields a hazard function that is non-monotonic in t.  The log-logistic
imposes the following functional forms on the hazard and survival functions:
S(t) =  
1
1 +  ( t ) pl
                                                             (3)
h(t) =  
p( t )
1 +  ( t )
p-1
p
l l
l
                                                             (4)
where the estimable parameters p and ë give the hazard function its exact shape.  The parameter p
determines the rate at which hazard rate increases or decreases across time, while the parameter ë
determines the portion of the hazard rate that is time-invariant.  We estimate these parameters
using maximum likelihood techniques and the following likelihood function:
L =  t p ) (1 - ) +  t p )
i=1
N
Q
i
1-Q
i
i iÕ d l d d l f(  S(| , | ,                                     (5)
where Qi = 1 if bank i failed during the sample period (uncensored observations); Qi = 0 f bank i
survived the sample period or was acquired during the sample period (censored observations); and
the estimable parameter ä is the probability that a bank will eventually fail (either during or after
the sample period).  The likelihood function collapses to the ‘standard’ duration model framework
for ä=1, but for ä<1 both S(t) and f(t) become conditional on the bank eventually failing. 
Of the three estimable parameters in the likelihood function ( *, 8, and p), the probability
of failure ä and the cross-sectional parameter 8 can b  made bank-specific as follows:
i ’ X
 =  
1
1 +  e i
d a                                                                     (6)
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i
- ’ X =  e il b                                                                             (7)
where Xi is a vector of bank-specific and time-invariant covariates, and the parameter vectors "
and $ are to be estimated.  The estimated "’s m asure the impact of the covariates on the
probability that a bank will survive -- a negative " indicates that the covariate is associated with a
lower probability of survival (a higher probability of failure).  The estimated $’s measure the
impact of the covariates on a b nk=s duration -- given that a bank will eventually fail, a negative $
coefficient indicates that the covariate is associated with a shorter duration (a faster failure). 
Thus, we have a very flexible specification in which the shape of the hazard function, the
probability of survival, and the time-to-failure all can vary from bank to bank.
Substituting (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7) into the likelihood function (5), and then performing
a log transformation, produces the log-likelihood function to be maximized.  Before estimation,
we specify (6) and (7) to include the following covariates:  URBAN, ENERGY, OCC, MBHC,
HHI, ASSETS, EQASS, ASSGROW, C&I, REL, CON, NPL, BIGDEP, SAL, and PREM.  These
covariates were defined above in section 3 and in Table 1.7 I  addition, we include a dummy
variable YEAR84 in the de novo bank model to control for possible differences in the conditions
facing banks chartered in 1984 versus 1985.  The remainder of this section discusses the expected
impact of these covariates on the probability of bank survival and on bank survival time.
                                         
7.  Several of the variables (ROA, EQUITY, LOAN, LIQUID, SEC) defined in Table 1 are not included as covariates in
the regressions we report here.  We account for EQUITY by including both lnASSETS and EQASS in the regressions.  
We account for LOAN by including its components REL, CON, and C&I in the regressions.   We exclude both LIQUID
and SEC, because adding them to the regressions reported here resulted in symptoms of multicolinearity.  When we
replaced the loan variables REL, CON, and C&I with either LIQUID or SEC, the symptoms disappeared and these
variables carried significant coefficients which were (as expected) the opposite sign from the coefficients on the loan
variables that they replaced.  We exclude ROA because most of its major drivers (asset mix, loan quality, financing mix,
spending levels, competition) are already included in the regressions.  Again, adding RO  to the regressions reported
(continued...)
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5.1  Determinants of the probability of survival
We expect that the probability of survival will vary positively with the following variables:
 MBHC, ASSETS, EQASS, and HHI.  Banks that are affiliated with mul ibank holding companies
may have access to greater financial resources and managerial expertise.  Large banks are
typically better diversified, and ceteris paribus large size may indicate a better managed or
otherwise more successful bank.  (We use lnASSETS= the natural log of ASSETS in our
regressions.)  High capital ratios allow banks to absorb losses without incurring financial distress.
 Banks located in highly concentrated markets face less competitive rivalry, and hence may be less
likely to fail during periods of financial distress. 
We expect that the probability of survival will be negatively associated with the following
variables:  ENERGY, LOANRAT, NPLRAT, SAL, PREM, BIGDEP, and OCC.   There were a
large number bank failures in the ‘energy’ states during our sample period due to disruptions in
energy-related industries, land price deflation, and relatively undiversified regional economies
(exacerbated by unit banking restrictions in some of these states).  A balance sheet heavy in loans
is less liquid and more sensitive to economic downturns than a balance sheet heavy in marketable
securities, cash, or cash equivalents.  Nonperforming loans reduce a bank’s return on investment,
and deplete bank capital if they have to be written off as bad debt.  Above average expenditures
on physical capital, premises, salaries and benefits may indicate inefficient management and/or
agency problems.  (In the regressions reported below, we combine these expenditures to create a
single covariate SPEND = SAL + PREM.)  Large CD financing is expensive, and these deposits
are likely to run should the bank get into trouble.  As discussed above, a disproportionate
                                                                                                                              
here resulted in symptoms of multicolinearity.
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percentage of newly chartered national banks failed in the 1980s and early 1990s, perhaps
reflecting the OCC's market-based chartering philosophy.  (We have no a priori reason to expect
that established national banks would be less likely to survive than established state chartered
banks, so we exclude OCC from the established bank regressions.)
The impact of URBAN and ASSGROW on the probability of survival is not clear a priori. 
Banks in urban regions face greater competitive rivalry than do rural banks, which suggests a
negative coefficient URBAN, but banks in urban regions may have greater opportunities for
diversification, which suggests a positive coefficient on URBAN.  (Because urban markets tend to
have much lower concentration levels than rural markets, we interact URBAN with HHI in the
regressions.)  Fast asset growth may simply indicate good economic conditions, which suggests a
positive coefficient on ASSGROW, but banks might be achieving fast growth by relaxing their
lending standards or by purchasing expensive non-core financing, sensitive business practices that
suggest a negative coefficient on ASSGROW.  The latter scenario may be more likely for de novo
banks than established banks, given the high levels of BIGDEP and ASSGROW at young banks.
5.2 Determinants of survival time
For the most part, we expect that the determinants of survival time (for banks that
eventually fail) will be similar to the determinants of the probability of survival.  However, the
following covariates are exceptions:  ENERGY, OCC, and ASSGROW.  While there is no doubt
that banks located in the 'energy' states were less likely to survive to the end of the sample period,
the economic disruptions that caused them to fail may have occurred relatively later in the sample
period.  If this is the case, then the survival times for failed energy state banks could be longer
than for failed banks in other states, and the coefficient on ENERGY will have a positive sign. 
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While the OCC's market-based chartering policy may have resulted in a higher rate of failure for
de novo national banks, the time to failure for failed de novo national banks need not be any
different than for failed de novo state chartered banks.  Moreover, if the OCC practiced a policy
of forbearance with its troubled banks, or if troubled national banks were disproportionately
located in states that suffered economic distress later in the sample period, then survival times for
failed de novo national banks could be relatively long.  These arguments suggest a neutral or
positive sign on the OCC coefficient.  Finally, although fast asset growth could increase the
probability of failure during times of economic distress, fast asset growth could temporarily delay
the inevitable for banks that do fail (e.g., by generating fee revenue from new loans of
questionable quality).  This suggests a positive sign for the coefficient on ASSGROW.
6.  Results
Table 2 displays the results of the duration models estimated separately for newly
chartered banks and established banks.  The estimated probability that the average bank will
eventually fail is 28.27% for de novo banks and 8.91% for established banks.  Note that these
estimated failure probabilities are somewhat higher than the raw failure percentages shown in
Table 1 (respectively, 23.48% and 6.60%) because some of the censored observations may
eventually fail in the future.
Although established banks are less likely to fail, those that do fail have relatively short
durations.  Of the established banks that are expected to eventually fail, half of them will fail
within an estimated 17.64 quarters (about 42 years) after the beginning of the sample period. 
Consistent with the ‘life-cycle’ explanation of de novo bank failure, newly chartered banks fail
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more slowly than established banks.  It takes an estimated 24.19 quarters (about 6 years) for half
of the de novo banks that are expected to fail to do so. 
The differences in failure rates and duration times can be seen clearly in estimated hazard
functions displayed in Figure 3.  These hazard functions are constructed by evaluating equation
(4) for the coefficient estimates from Table 2 and the covaria e means from Table 1.  The
estimated probability of failure for established banks starts out near zero but immediately
increases; peaks at about 8 percent for banks that survive for about 5 years; and then declines
toward a lower long-run level as the bank failure wave (see Figure 1) dissipates.  The estimated
probability of failure for de novo banks is near zero for about two years, and although it increases
rapidly after about three years, it remains below the established bank hazard rate for five years. 
The de novo hazard rate peaks at nearly 15 percent for banks that have survived for seven years,
and then gradually declines toward the established bank hazard rate.  Although both of the hazard
functions in Figure 3 are in decline at the end of the sample period, they remain positive, which
reflects the estimated non-zero probability of failure for the censored observations.
6.1  Results:  determinants of the probability of survival
For both de novo banks and established banks, the probability of survival is strongly
correlated with bank financial condition.  All of the following caused a statistically significant
reduction in the probability of de novo and established bank survival: high asset growth rates, high
levels of loans-to-assets, reliance on purchased deposit funding, and heavy expenditures on
overhead.  Neither bank size nor capitalization was a significant indicator of future bank failure,
and poor loan quality was a significant predictor of failure only for established banks.  (Note: NPL
would likely have been significantly negative for de novo banks, and EQASS would likely have
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been significantly positive for both sets of banks, had we observed our c variate vector Xi a year
prior to failure, as did Cole and Gu ther 1995, rather than at the beginning of the sample period.)
In contrast, very few of the non-financial covari tes had a substantial influence on the
probability of survival.  As expected, being located in an energy state reduced the probability of
survival for both de novo and established banks.  Established urban banks were more likely to
survive than established rural banks, perhaps due to the diversification opportunities available in
these areas.  Aside from URBAN and ENERGY, however, none of the locational, regulatory, or
organizational covariates were significantly correlated with the probability of survival.  The non-
significance of OCC suggests that the Comptroller’s market based chartering policy did not
contribute to the high rate of de novo bank failures during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
6.2  Results:  determinants of survival time
The determinants of survival time differed for de novo banks and established banks.  Only
CON and NPL had significant coefficients for the established banks.  The estimates indicate that a
higher level of consumer lending increased survival time, and a higher level of nonperforming
loans reduced survival time, for established banks that eventually failed.  Note that neither of these
two covariates were significant determinants of survival time for de novo banks. 
For failing de novo banks, having a large capital cushion, growing fast, holding a national
charter, and affiliation with a multibank holding company all delayed failure, while high levels of
large deposit financing and overhead spending both hastened time to failure.  Note that none of
these covariates were significant determinants of survival time for established banks.  The
significant positive coefficient on OCC is consistent with forbearance, or may simply indicate that
the OCC happened to charter new banks in areas that experienced economic disruptions later than
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the rest of the country.  The significant positive sign on ASSGROW is consistent with new banks
attempting to delay the inevitable by fast growth.  Additional research would be necessary to
confirm these interpretations. 
The lack of uniformity in significant coefficients across the two models indicates that there
are substantial differences in new and established banks.   Moreover, the dearth of significant
coefficients in the established bank model suggests that predicting the time to failure for
established banks is simply more difficult than making this prediction for de novo banks.  Perhaps
timing the failure of a cohort of newly chartered banks is easier because they are all the same age
and/or because they are on a more predictable portion of their life cycles. 
7.  Summary and conclusions
Like most new business ventures, newly chartered banks are financially fragile and prone
to failure during economic disruptions.  Although it is generally believed that the recent explosion
in the number of new bank charters will have beneficial competitive effects in local markets, any
benefits will be permanent only if these new banks can survive long enough to become financially
viable.  In this study, we explore the probability and the determinants of new bank failure.
We examine 656 de novo banks that were chartered in 1984 and 1985, just prior to a
period of intense financial distress for the banking industry.  We also observe 1,288 small
established banks at the beginning of 1985 that were operating in the same geographic markets as
the de novo banks.  By estimating ‘split-population’ duration models for each of these samples,
we can test whether the probability of failure, the timing of failure, and the determinants of failure
differed for new banks and established banks during this stressful period.
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The results of our tests are consistent with the ‘life-cycle’ theory of bank failure
introduced by DeYoung (1999).  Because newly chartered banks are heavily capitalized and hold
portfolios of unseasoned loans, they are initially less likely to fail than established banks.  But
rapid asset growth, subpar profitability, and declining loan quality gradually erode de novo capital
stocks.  Our models indicate that the de novo bank failure rate catches up with the established
bank failure rate after about five years, and after about seven years de novo banks are twice as
likely to fail as established banks.  Thus, one of the primary determinants of de novo bank failure
is the ‘newness= of the newly chartered bank. 
 Aside from the age of the bank, the determinants of failure are quite similar for de novo
and established banks.  Adverse economic conditions, rapid asset growth, concentrations of risky
and illiquid investments, large amounts of purchased funds, and excess overhead spending reduce
the likelihood of survival for both sets of banks.  For new banks that eventually failed,
concentrations of business loans, large amounts of purchased funds, low capital ratios, and excess
overhead spending accelerated failure, while fast asset growth, affiliation with a mu tibank holding
company, and holding a federal charter delayed failure.  In contrast, none of these conditions had
a significant effect on the time-to-failure for established banks.   
These results have implications for bank chartering policy.  We find no significant
evidence that national banks were more likely to fail than state chartered banks.  This suggests
that the relatively lenient, market-based chartering policy practiced by the Comptroller of the
Currency during the 1980s increased the number of competitors in local banking markets without
causing disproportionate numbers of new bank failures.  Our results also have implications for
capital regulation of young banks.  We find no evidence that low capital ratios predict de novo
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bank failure, but we do find that low capital ratios accelerate failure for banks that eventually fail.
 This suggests that the higher required levels of capital imposed on young banks in the 1990s
likely have not reduced the probability of new bank failure, but rather serve as a buffer that
provides extra time to resolve young banks should they become troubled institutions.  Finally, our
results should be instructive for de novo bank owners and managers.  We find that the risk drivers
at new banks and established banks are fundamentally similar.  However, the market appears to
punish mistakes more quickly and more severely at young banks.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
De novo banks:  Began operations between 1984:Q1 and 1985:Q4.  Financial ratios are measured
at end of fourth full quarter of operations. 
Established banks:  Were at least 25 years old, had less than $100 million in assets, and had at
least 6% equity/assets as of 1985:Q1.   Located in the same geographic markets as the de novo
banks.  Financial ratios measured at beginning of 1985.
656 de novo banks 1288 established banks
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Outcome:
% failed before 1999 23.48% --  6.60% --
% acquired before 1999 43.45% -- 37.73% --
% survived until 1999 33.07% -- 55.67% --
t = duration 36.98 qtrs. 18.28 43.26 qtrs. 17.67
Structure variables:
URBAN = 1 if in MSA .7774 -- .7298 --
ENERGY = 1 if in energy state .4878 -- .3036 --
OCC = 1 if national bank .6189 -- .2756 --
MBHC = 1 if a mbhc affiliate .1219 -- .1685 --
HHI = Herfindahl Index 1597 1339 1369 1075
Financial ratios:
ASSETS (1985 $000) $11,141 23,328 $42,401 25,429
EQUITY (1985 $000) $2,689 6,159 $3,687 2,292
EQASS (equity/assets) .1345 .0598 .0904 .0283
ROA (net income/assets) -.0122 .0209 .0099 .0079
ASSGROW (% annual growth) 182.79% 210.41   8.28%  22.73
BIGDEP (CDs>$100K/assets) .2441 .1437 .0963 .0767
LIQUID (cash+equivalents+securities/assets).3622 .1569 .4505 .1402
SEC (securities/assets) .1203 .1333 .3209 .1383
LOAN (loans/assets) .5917 .1597 .5243 .1396
REL (real estate loans/assets) .2167 .1299 .1962 .1014
CON (consumer loans/assets) .1308 .1032 .1337 .0835
C&I (C&I loans/assets) .2293 .1288 .1773 .1127
NPL (nonperforming loans/assets) .0036 .0078 .0134 .0156
SAL (salary expense/assets) .0186 .0090 .0166 .0109
PREM (premises expense/assets) .0085 .0061 .0047 .0037
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Table 2
Results from split-population duration models.  Slope coefficients that are significantly
different from zero at the 1% and 5% levels are indicated by * and **, respectively.
656 de novo banks 1288 established banks
estimate std. error estimate std. error
8 0.0413 0.0018 0.0567 0.0138
p 5.8076 0.5462 2.6237 0.3065
* (probability of failure) 0.2827 0.0259 0.0891 0.0085
median quarters until failure 24.1879 1.0565 17.6432 4.2920
Log Likelihood -272.03 -- -293.39 --
probability of survival parameter estimates
constant  3.3704 1.7671     5.7387** 1.8306
YEAR84 -0.2263 0.1487 -- --
OCC  0.2689 0.1759 -- --
ENERGY    -0.7036** 0.2072    -1.0322** 0.2038
MBHC  0.0611 0.3187 -0.3389 0.2539
URBAN -2.6306 2.6418    0.9294* 0.4685
HHI  3.1200 1.9807  2.4681 1.7149
URBAN*HHI -2.6306 2.6418 -4.4250 2.7398
lnASSETS -0.0549 0.1597 -0.1503 0.1484
ASSGROW   -0.1686* 0.0877     -1.8188** 0.7449
EQASS  0.4736 1.7933  2.4482 3.1913
REL    -2.3691** 0.7489 -1.4918 1.2873
CON  -1.8882* 0.8727    -4.2449** 1.3823
C&I    -2.7432** 0.7559    -3.2825** 0.9124
NPL -8.3958 8.0018  -14.5960** 4.7782
BIGDEP    -1.9585** 0.6479  -2.5908* 1.1801
SPEND  -21.8980** 7.0518  -37.7520** 14.3190
survival time parameter estimates
constant     2.2246** 0.5638   0.3718 1.9407
YEAR84  0.1033 0.0695 -- --
OCC     0.1615** 0.0652 -- --
ENERGY -0.1229 0.0677   0.0911 0.2924
MBHC   0.2310* 0.1069   0.0986 0.3048
URBAN 0.3449 0.2398  -0.6803 0.5251
HHI 1.5060 0.8995  -2.1435 1.5862
URBAN*HHI -0.6007 1.0391   4.1046 3.7353
lnASSETS  0.0654 0.0509   0.2482 0.1687
ASSGROW    0.0381* 0.0170   0.3953 0.6223
EQASS      2.3601** 0.6078   0.8857 5.5615
REL  -0.0858 0.3002  -0.3383 1.4653
CON  -0.3353 0.4080    2.7518* 1.2985
C&I    -0.5995* 0.2943 -0.9506 1.0708
NPL  -5.2410 3.1945  -10.2270* 4.7279
BIGDEP      -0.8947** 0.2204  0.1515 1.2945
SPEND     -5.4879** 2.3599 11.8090 15.1220
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